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LegaL TooLs for environmenTaL equiTy vs. 
environmenTaL JusTice1
Mike Ewall, Esq.*
In 1982, when Benjamin Chavis coined the term “environ-mental racism” to describe the targeting of a black com-munity in Warren County, North Carolina for a toxic waste 
dump, it brought together two powerful movements – the civil 
rights and environmental movements – into a growing force that 
would eventually reach the White House and the United States 
Supreme Court.2 No one would have guessed at the time that 
within a five day span around Earth Day 2001, the legal side 
of the movement against environmental racism would see its 
brightest, and then darkest, days.
Since the early 1980s, numerous studies have looked at 
the correlation between environmental hazards and the race 
and class demographics of the communities where these haz-
ards are located.3 The vast majority have shown a trend toward 
low-income communities and especially communities of color 
being unfairly burdened with excessive pollution from a variety 
of polluting industries and chemical exposures.4 These studies 
affirmed the understanding of an environmental racism trend. 
While many are quick to conclude that communities of color 
are targeted solely because of their generally low-income socio-
economic status, most of the studies have demonstrated that race 
is more of a factor than class.5 In other words, if one were to 
compare a middle-class community of color to a low-income 
white community, and look at which community is more likely 
to have a hazardous waste facility sited there, the middle-class 
community of color would have a greater chance of being tar-
geted for such a facility. In fact, in some cases, race is a more 
significant indicator of pollution burdens than income, poverty, 
childhood poverty, education, job classification, or home own-
ership.6 Demographic studies showing disparate distribution 
of polluting industrial facilities have been key aspects of many 
environmental racism lawsuits. Such studies of discriminatory 
effects are necessary since intentional discrimination is very 
hard to prove, except in the rare cases where inappropriate 
industry siting reports are leaked.7
The growing movement against environmental racism came 
together in October 1991 for the First National People of Color 
Environmental Leadership Summit held in Washington, D.C. 
Participants drafted and adopted the seventeen Principles of 
Environmental Justice.8 The Principles set forth a bold vision of 
what would be necessary to address environmental racism.9
Initially, the controversy in Warren County, North Carolina 
resulted in the General Accounting Office studying the locations 
of hazardous waste landfills in the southeastern United States.10 
The 1983 study found that three of the four existing hazardous 
waste landfills were in African-American communities, when 
African-Americans constituted only twenty percent of the 
region’s population.11
In 1990, the Congressional Black Caucus met with the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), accompanied by 
academics and activists, to discuss the disparate environmen-
tal risks in low-income and minority communities.12 The EPA 
created the Environmental Equity Workgroup in July 1990 in 
response to the presentation of findings by social scientists that 
“racial minority and low-income populations bear a higher envi-
ronmental risk burden than the general population” and that the 
EPA’s inspections failed to adequately protect low-income com-
munities of color.13 Analysis shows that the agency takes longer 
to get around to cleaning up toxic waste sites in communities of 
color and that penalties under hazardous waste laws were five 
times higher in white communities than in communities of color 
and forty-six percent higher for other programs relating to air, 
water, and waste.14
“Equity” – DErailing thE EnvironmEntal 
JusticE movEmEnt
In June 1992, the Environmental Equity Workgroup pro-
duced a report that supported the findings that recommended 
the formation of an EPA office to address these disparities.15 In 
November 1992, one year after the Principles of Environmental 
Justice were written, the EPA formed an Office of Environmental 
Equity.16 In response to public criticism, the EPA changed the 
name of the office to the Office of Environmental Justice in 
1994.17
The “equity” versus “justice” framing is more than mere 
semantics. It represents the fundamental difference between the 
concepts of “poison people equally” and “stop poisoning people, 
period!” There is not a single mention in the movement-defined 
Principles of Environmental Justice of the notion that the goal 
is to simply redistribute environmental harms so that white 
communities have their “fair share” of pollution.18 Even if this 
“equity” vision were possible, the environmental justice move-
ment has put forth a much deeper analysis, based on phasing out 
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inappropriate technologies that ought not exist in any commu-
nity. However, the EPA, and numerous state environmental agen-
cies bunted and co-opted the bolder “justice” agenda by setting 
up offices and working groups around environmental “equity.”19
When the EPA and a number of state environmental agen-
cies cleaned up the titles of their programs, renaming them 
“environmental justice,” they retained their “equity” agenda. 
Today, governmental bodies and others who have followed their 
lead universally define environmental justice as some version of 
“fair treatment and meaningful involvement.” The EPA defines 
environmental justice as:
the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all 
people regardless of race, color, national origin, or 
income with respect to the development, implementa-
tion, and enforcement of environmental laws, regula-
tions, and policies. Fair treatment means that no group 
of people should bear a disproportionate share of the 
negative environmental consequences resulting from 
industrial, governmental and commercial operations 
or policies. Meaningful involvement means that: (1) 
people have an opportunity to participate in decisions 
about activities that may affect their environment and/
or health; (2) the publics contribution can influence the 
regulatory agency’s decision; (3) their concerns will be 
considered in the decision making process; and (4) the 
decision makers seek out and facilitate the involvement 
of those potentially affected.20
Without any real legislative teeth to back up these “equity 
posing as justice” policies, environmental agencies have no tools 
to even try to redistribute environmental harms. Rather, they use 
these policies to try to look responsive to environmental jus-
tice concerns when trotting them out at government-sponsored 
“environmental justice” conferences, public meetings and hear-
ings on pending pollution permits, and other forums.
As long as there is no blatant intentional racism to be found, 
the “fair treatment” hurdle is deemed cleared, as the agencies 
have no authority to act on the distributional equity of harms 
concept in their “fair treatment” definition. The “meaningful 
involvement” hurdle still looks, on the ground, like the usual 
agency habit of holding a public hearing and ignoring/dismiss-
ing the comments before issuing pollution permits. The fourth 
part of the “meaningful involvement” definition – that “deci-
sion makers seek out and facilitate the involvement of those 
potentially affected” – is sometimes made real when exceptional 
agency staff go the extra mile to ensure that the public knows 
about a meeting or hearing. However, it is still far too frequent 
that the outreach is so inadequate, or the meeting logistics made 
so inconvenient, that no one from the impacted community even 
shows up at these “environmental justice” meetings.21
GaininG Ground
The same year that the EPA changed the Office’s name to 
“Environmental Justice,” President Clinton, on February 11th, 
1994, signed Executive Order 12898, titled “Federal Actions 
To Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and 
Low-Income Populations.”22 The Executive Order requires each 
federal agency to develop an agency-wide environmental justice 
strategy, sets up an interagency working group that reports to the 
President, requires certain agency studies, and sets forth a public 
participation plan.23
While White House-level recognition of environmental jus-
tice was a shot in the arm of the movement, the Order explicitly 
states that it does not go beyond current law and creates no new 
rights or remedies, procedural or otherwise.24 Nonetheless, the 
Executive Order was helpful in a groundbreaking case before 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”) in 1997 – In 
Matter of Lousiana Energy Services, L.P.25 – perhaps the only 
case where an agency denied a permit to a polluting industry 
because of racially discriminatory impacts in the siting process. 
Louisiana Energy Services (“LES”) sought to build a uranium 
enrichment facility between the tiny towns of Forest Grove and 
Center Springs in rural Northern Louisiana’s Claiborne Parish.26 
A grassroots community group, Citizens Against Nuclear Trash 
(“CANT”), challenged the proposal’s permits in the adminis-
trative process before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 
(“ASLB”) of the NRC.27 Founded by freed slaves after the Civil 
War, the two towns (with a combined population of about 250) 
were about 97% African-American.28 Their inhabitants lived 
in grinding poverty, with no stores, schools, medical clinics, 
The “equity” versus “justice” framing is more  
than mere semantics. It represents the fundamental 
difference between the concepts of “poison people 
equally” and “stop poisoning people, period!”
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or businesses in the towns, and no running water in many of 
the homes.29 Over 69% of the black population of Claiborne 
Parish earned less than $15,000 annually, 50% earned less than 
$10,000, and 30% earned less than $5,000.30 Over 31% of the 
black population in Claiborne Parish had no motor vehicles, over 
10% lacked complete plumbing in their houses, and 58% lacked 
a high school education.31 One would be hard-pressed to find 
a more underprivileged community to target for such a facility.
To find a site for their uranium enrichment facility, LES 
hired a company, Fluor Daniel, Inc., with extensive experience 
in industrial facility site selection.32 In their siting process, they 
had initially narrowed a list of potential sites to seventy-eight, 
where the average percentage of black population within a 
one-mile radius of each of the sites across sixteen parishes was 
28.35%.33 Since the black population in Louisiana was about 
32.5%, this was pretty fair to start.34 However, once the list of 
potential sites was cut to thirty-seven, the average black popula-
tion rose to 36.78%.35 It rose again to 64.74% once the list of 
sites was narrowed to six.36 At the end of the process, they man-
aged to pick the one site with the highest percent black popula-
tion of all seventy-eight examined sites (97.1%).37
LES admitted to doing an “eyeball” assessment of potential 
sites.38 They admitted to eliminating sites from consideration 
because they were close to “sensitive receptors” like hospitals, 
schools, and nursing homes (thus eliminating communities 
privileged enough to have such amenities) or because the site is 
near a “very nice lake” with “nice homes, vacation and fishing, 
hunting.”39 The ASLB found this evidence to be “more than suf-
ficient to raise a reasonable inference that racial considerations 
played some part in the site selection process.”40 In a powerfully 
worded decision, the ASLB stated, in part:
Racial discrimination in the facility site selection 
process cannot be uncovered with only a cursory 
review of the description of that process appearing in 
an applicant’s environmental report. If it were so eas-
ily detected, racial discrimination would not be such 
a persistent and enduring problem in American soci-
ety. Racial discrimination is rarely, if ever, admitted. 
Instead, it is often rationalized under some other seem-
ingly racially neutral guise, making it difficult to ferret 
out. Moreover, direct evidence of racial discrimination 
is seldom found. Therefore, under the circumstances 
presented by this licensing action, if the President’s 
nondiscrimination directive is to have any meaning a 
much more thorough investigation must be conducted 
by the Staff to determine whether racial discrimination 
played a role in the [enrichment facility] site selection 
process.
. . . [T]he Staff must conduct an objective, thorough, 
and professional investigation that looks beneath the 
surface of the description of the site selection process 
in the Environmental Report. In other words, the Staff 
must lift some rocks and look under them.41
The decision acknowledged that the obligations under the 
Executive Order were new to the agency and that agency staff’s 
primary responsibilities have historically been to evaluate tech-
nical concerns, not to apply the social science skills needed to 
investigate whether racial discrimination played a part in a facil-
ity siting decision – skills that are far from the experience and 
expertise of NRC staff.42 The ASLB’s decision concluded with 
a determination that a staff investigation of the siting process, 
to determine whether racial discrimination played a role in that 
process, was essential to ensure compliance with the Executive 
Order, and that the Final Environmental Impact Statement was 
insufficient in other ways and needed to be revised.43
Such a strong decision was a welcome surprise, especially 
coming from an agency whose very existence is financially tied44 
to the survival of the notoriously racist nuclear industry, whose 
uranium mining and nuclear waste disposal burdens fall almost 
exclusively on black, Hispanic, and Native American communi-
ties.45 Though the victory over LES in Louisiana held,46 the legal 
precedent was undermined on appeal.
On appeal to the NRC Commissioners, the Commission 
reversed the ASLB’s requirement of an inquiry into racial dis-
crimination in siting, but affirmed its disparate impact ruling.47 
In reversing the requirement of inquiry into racial discrimina-
tion, the Commission held that no “nondiscrimination direc-
tive” exists in Executive Order 12898 and that the National 
Environmental Policy Act (the law requiring Environmental 
Impact Statements on certain federal projects) is not “a tool for 
addressing problems of racial discrimination.”48
TiTle Vi as a Tool for enVironmenTal JusTice
As the LES case was playing out, the nation’s first attempt to 
address environmental racism using Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 was moving toward the U.S. Supreme Court, fresh 
from an amazing victory in the Third Circuit.
The mostly African-American City of Chester, Pennsylvania 
is home to the nation’s largest trash incinerator, a sewage treat-
ment plant that burns the county’s sewage sludge, a paper mill 
that burns waste coal, numerous chemical plants and toxic waste 
sites, and formerly hosted the nation’s largest medical waste 
autoclave. It is surrounded on either side by oil refineries and 
coal, oil and gas-fired power plants.49
In 1996, Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living 
(“CRCQL” – pronounced “circle”) sued the Pennsylvania 
Department of Environmental Protection (“PADEP”) for issuing 
a permit to Soil Remediation Systems (“SRS”), a company plan-
ning to build a facility to clean petroleum contaminated soil by 
burning off the contaminants.50 This “soil burner” facility would 
have been sandwiched between the trash and sewage sludge 
incinerators.
Suit was brought in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
under both sections 601 and 602 of the Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964.51 Section 601, codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, pro-
vides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground 
of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation 
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
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under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assis-
tance.52 Section 602, codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1, authorizes 
and directs agencies, such as the EPA, which provide financial 
assistance to state agencies like PADEP “to effectuate the provi-
sions of § 2000d of this title . . . by issuing rules, regulations, 
or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with 
achievement of the objectives of the statute . . . .”53
The complaint alleged that PADEP’s grant of the permit 
violated: 1) § 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; 2) 
EPA’s civil rights regulations promulgated pursuant to § 602 of 
Title VI; and 3) PADEP’s “assurance pursuant to the regulations 
that it would not violate the regulations.”54 The District Court 
quickly did away with the first cause of action, citing Supreme 
Court precedent that § 601 applies only to intentional discrimi-
nation and that CRCQL failed to allege that PADEP intention-
ally discriminated when granting the pollution permit to SRS.55 
The District Court dismissed the second and third claims on the 
basis that, while there is a private right of action under § 601, 
there is no such right under § 602.56
In Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif,57 
the Chester residents appealed the ruling to the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals, focusing only on the second cause of action: 
the core § 602 claim.58 Establishing important precedent, the 
Third Circuit reversed the District Court’s ruling.59 The Third 
Circuit panel found that the District Court misread the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s fractured ruling in Guardians Ass’n v. Civil 
Service Commission of New York City,60 falsely assuming that 
it stood for the notion that there is private right of action under 
§ 602.61
Instead, the Third Circuit recognized that the Supreme Court 
had since recognized that Guardians affirmed 1) that a private 
right of action exists under § 601 of Title VI, requiring plaintiffs 
to prove discriminatory intent; and 2) that agencies may validly 
promulgate discriminatory effect regulations under § 602.62 The 
ruling did not, however, decide the issue of whether there is a 
private right of action to enforce regulations promulgated under 
§ 602.63 The Third Circuit stitched together two sets of opinions 
in Guardians to infer that a five-justice majority would support a 
private right of action under § 602.64 A dissent by Justice Stevens 
(joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun) concluded with a 
statement that the plaintiffs “only had to show that the respon-
dents’ actions were producing discriminatory effects in order to 
prove a violation of [the regulations].”65 Justices White, writing 
for the court, and Marshall, dissenting, both found it accept-
able for a plaintiff to bring a discriminatory effect case under § 
601, so the Third Circuit inferred that they would find the same 
acceptable under § 602.66 This five Justice-majority inference 
wasn’t enough for the Third Circuit to hold that Guardians is 
dispositive on the Chester case, since the Supreme Court had not 
spoken directly to the issue.67
With nothing dispositive in Supreme Court precedent, 
the Third Circuit looked at its own precedent.68 In doing so, it 
found that the District Court misread Third Circuit precedent 
in concluding that no private right of action exists under § 602 
when, in fact, that case spoke only to whether a plaintiff must 
exhaust administrative remedies under § 602 before bringing a 
suit directly under § 601.69 With no precedent on the specific 
question, the Third Circuit applied its own three-prong test for 
determining when it is appropriate to imply private rights of 
action to enforce regulations and found that there is a private 
right of action under § 602.70
PADEP appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.71 By the time 
the case reached the highest court, PADEP had revoked the per-
mit for SRS, the permittee whose permit challenge formed the 
basis of the case.72 Both sides, fearing unfavorable precedent, 
asked the Supreme Court to declare the case moot, but PADEP 
also asked the Supreme Court to vacate the Third Circuit deci-
sion, which – over the protest of CRCQL – the Supreme Court 
did.73 In a one-sentence decision, the case was vacated as moot 
with instructions to dismiss.74 After all this effort, Chester 
residents had one less polluter to contend with, but impacted 
communities around the country were left again with no federal 
court precedent allowing a private right of action under Title VI 
for allegations of discriminatory effects against federally funded 
permitting agencies. Until Camden.
Starting Over
Some of the same Philadelphia attorneys involved in Chester 
found opportunity to start over, setting precedent in the same 
Circuit, across the river in Camden, New Jersey – a community 
with a very similar story to that of Chester. In 2001,  (Camden 
I)75 was filed under similar theories as used in Chester.76
Like Chester, South Camden’s Waterfront South neigh-
borhood is surrounded by toxic industrial threats.77 The South 
Camden lawsuit was over a permit granted by NJDEP to Saint 
Lawrence Cement (“SLC”) for a facility that would grind blast 
furnace slag, exposing the community to fine particulate matter 
laden with toxic metals.78
In a lengthy, well-documented, and carefully thought-out 
opinion, the District Court sided with the South Camden resi-
dents, concluding that:
(1) The NJDEP’s failure to consider any evidence 
beyond SLC’s compliance with technical emissions 
standards, and specifically its failure to consider the 
totality of the circumstances surrounding the operation 
of SLC’s proposed facility, violates the EPA’s regula-
tions promulgated to implement Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964; and (2) Plaintiffs have established 
a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination 
based on race and national origin in violation of the 
EPA’s regulations promulgated pursuant to § 602 of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.79
As in Chester, the plaintiffs included a § 601 claim of inten-
tional discrimination, but didn’t back it up, focusing instead on 
their § 602 disparate impact discrimination claim.80 After the 
Supreme Court vacated the Third Circuit’s decision in Chester, 
the Circuit revisited the issue of whether there is an implied pri-
vate right of action under § 602 of Title VI, finding in Powell v. 
Ridge81 that such a right exists.82
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That matter being settled law in the Circuit, the court moved 
on to rule on whether mere compliance with existing environ-
mental laws and regulations is sufficient to meet the require-
ments of Title VI.83 In other words, even if a corporate polluter 
would release pollution in amounts deemed acceptable, and 
permitted under environmental regulations, could that polluter 
still be found to be contributing to a violation of a community’s 
civil rights under Title VI? This question strikes at the heart of 
what environmental justice activists have complained about for 
years. Environmental permitting agencies routinely give out pol-
lution permits that are calculated to allow only a certain number 
of people to die of cancer. This permitting regime is widely criti-
cized for not accounting for vulnerable populations (children, the 
elderly, fetuses, those with compromised immune systems) and 
for looking at only one chemical exposure at a time. The exist-
ing permitting regime does not factor in the increased chance 
of illness when one’s community is surrounded by dozens of 
pollution sources, each exposing the community to a wide array 
of pollutants that can even interact with one another to magnify 
their health impacts.84 Industry and government officials pretend 
that an industrial facility that stays within its permit limits means 
that the facility is “safe” and thus not harming health. This is far 
from the truth.
As the District Court framed the issue in Camden I: “This 
case presents the novel question of whether a recipient of EPA 
funding has an obligation under Title VI to consider racially 
discriminatory disparate impacts when determining whether to 
issue a permit, in addition to compliance with applicable envi-
ronmental standards.”85 The court found that an agency does 
have such an obligation.86 To reach this conclusion, the court 
looked at the fact that permitting agencies do not look at the 
cumulative effects of permitting multiple polluters in a single 
community.87 Since environmental laws and regulations are not 
yet up to this task, the court held that it is appropriate for this 
to be considered as part of a Title VI analysis in the permitting 
process.88
The District Court also looked closely at the issue of 
particulate matter (soot), since the EPA was in the process of 
adopting stricter regulations on fine particulate matter, known as 
PM-2.5.89 Regulations in effect at the time only covered PM-10 
(larger soot particles), but a substantial body of science showing 
major health impacts from the smaller PM-2.5 pollution caused 
the EPA to propose more stringent regulations.90 At the time of 
the case, these PM-2.5 regulations were not in effect and NJDEP 
had no legal obligation to consider this sort of pollution in envi-
ronmental permitting. However, the body of science showing 
harm existed and was enough to prod the EPA into regulatory 
action. The District Court held it relevant to consider the issue 
within the context of a Title VI disparate impact analysis.91
Environmental laws and regulations often take several 
decades to catch up to what science tells us about the threat of 
pollutants on health. This is largely due to the need for a “scien-
tific consensus” to line up enough dead bodies before regulatory 
and political action against a pollutant is even possible, as well 
as the reality of corporate campaign contributions, lobbying, and 
lawsuits intended to block or delay implementation of new regu-
lations. Camden I’s novel “totality of the circumstances”92 use of 
Title VI to shortcut the glacial environmental regulatory process 
and apply modern science to community health burdens is a 
huge benefit to impacted minority communities, but a dramatic 
threat to the economic interests of corporate polluters.
On April 19, 2001, three days before Earth Day, the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey granted a 
preliminary injunction to the South Camden plaintiffs.93 The 
court vacated SLC’s air pollution permits and enjoined the 
cement company from operating its proposed facility.94 The 
court when on to stipulate operations could not commence until 
the NJDEP performed an appropriate adverse disparate impact 
analysis in compliance with Title VI to the satisfaction of the 
District Court.95 The Earth Week celebration lasted five days.
The CourTs Close The Door on  
environmenTal JusTiCe
On, April 24, 2001, two days after Earth Day, this vic-
tory came crashing down as the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on 
Alexander v. Sandoval.96 The case had nothing to do with envi-
ronmental matters, but did involve § 602.97 The high court ruled 
that there is no private right of action under § 602, effectively 
shutting down any litigation over racially disparate impacts 
caused by federally-funded agencies, unless one can prove 
intent.98 The 5-4 majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia, 
focused on the idea that courts may no longer find that there is 
a private right of action to enforce federal law unless Congress 
intends such a right.99
When Title VI was enacted in 1964, the Court was in the 
habit of creating private rights of action and providing remedies 
as they found necessary to effectuate congressional purpose.100 
This practice was abandoned in 1975 when the Supreme Court 
created a test in Cort v. Ash,101 setting forth four factors to deter-
mine whether Congress intended for a private right of action to 
exist under a statute:
(1) whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose ben-
efit the statute was enacted;
(2) whether there is any indication of legislative intent, 
explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to 
deny one;
(3) whether it is consistent with the underlying purpose of 
the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the 
plaintiffs; and
(4) whether the cause of action is one traditionally rel-
egated to state law.102
The Sandoval majority ignored most of the Cort v. Ash fac-
tors, focusing narrowly on part of the second factor where the 
Court stated: “We therefore begin (and find that we can end) our 
search for Congress’s intent with the text and structure of Title 
VI.”103 The majority pointed to Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington 
to back up their opinion that, “like substantive federal law itself, 
private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by 
Congress.”105 While the Sandoval majority failed to point this 
out, Touche Ross backs up their abuse of the Cort v. Ash factors 
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by stating that the “Court did not decide that each of these fac-
tors is entitled to equal weight.”106
The Sandoval majority concluded its Cort v. Ash analysis 
by holding that the “rights-creating” language in § 601 (“no 
person … shall … be subjected to discrimination”) is not present 
in § 602 because § 602 “limits agencies to ‘effectuating’ rights 
already created by § 601,” and that “the focus of § 602 is twice 
removed from the individuals who will ultimately benefit from 
Title VI’s protection.”107 Yet, as Justice Stevens pointed out in 
a dissenting opinion, it makes sense that there is no “rights-
creating” language in § 602 since “it is perfectly obvious that 
the regulations authorized by § 602 must be designed to protect 
precisely the same people protected by § 601.”108
In his dissent, Justice Stevens first pointed out that the ques-
tion of a private right of action under § 602 should not even be 
before the Supreme Court, since not a single Court of Appeals 
has ruled that there is no such right.109 He listed eleven cases in 
ten Federal Circuits where federal courts, all on the same page, 
supported a private right of action under § 602; a twelth case 
suggested that the question was still open.110
Second, Justice Stevens argued that the majority misinter-
preted Guardians. He pointied out, as the Third Circuit did in 
Chester, that there were five justices supporting the notion that 
“private parties may seek injunctive relief against governmental 
practices that have the effect of discriminating against racial and 
ethnic minorities.”111
Third, Justice Stevens argued that a proper analysis under 
Cort v. Ash supports the notion that there is an implied private 
right of action under § 602.112 Clearly, there is no doubt that the 
plaintiff in a discriminatory impact case is one of the class for 
whose benefit the statute was enacted, and it is consistent with 
the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme to imply such a 
remedy for the plaintiffs. Justice Stevens documented that there 
was legislative intent – among proponents and opponents of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 – that Title VI included a private right of 
action for discriminatory impacts.113 The Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Cannon v. University of Chicago114 found that Congress 
intended a private right of action to enforce both Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972 (a gender discrimination statute 
modeled on Title VI, and expected to be construed the same 
way) and Title VI.115 Justice Stevens pointed out that the analysis 
of Cort in Cannon “was equally applicable to intentional dis-
crimination and disparate impact claims” and that Cannon was, 
in fact, a disparate impact case.116
Fourth, Justice Stevens argued that § 601 is not limited to 
intentional discrimination, in contradiction to the majority which 
claimed such a limitation was “beyond dispute”.117 He dissected 
the Court’s decisions in Guardians and Regents University of 
California v. Bakke118 and found that Bakke did not rule directly 
on the matter and that Guardians mistakenly assumed that Bakke 
did.119
Most significant to the resolution of the Camden case is 
Justice Stevens’ argument that there is still private right of action 
reaching § 602 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.120 Section 1983 of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1871 imposes liability on anyone who, under 
color of state law, deprives a person “of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”121 It is almost 
comical in that, for all the wrangling a private right of action 
under § 602, plaintiffs can still bring the same legal challenge by 
simply invoking § 1983 to enforce rights created by regulation, 
causing Justice Stevens to describe Sandoval as “something of a 
sport.”122
The sporting continued in Camden I on April 24th, 2001. 
Sandoval had been decided that morning. That afternoon, the 
District Court asked the parties in Camden I to brief the follow-
ing two questions: (1) whether the claim could be brought as an 
intentional discrimination claim under § 601 and (2) whether the 
§ 602 claim could be maintained by invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
as Justice Stevens suggested.123 Perhaps for the first time in any 
federal court, the Camden I case raised the question of “whether 
the same disparate impact regulations which can no longer 
be enforced through a private right of action brought directly 
under § 602 of Title VI, can be enforced pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983.”124 The District Court upheld its April 19 decision and 
injunction, finding that the disparate impact discrimination claim 
can be brought under § 1983.125
As before, the victory was short-lived. The courtroom door 
shut to civil rights plaintiffs in Sandoval was to be one in a series 
of doors slamming shut, closing out opportunities for justice in 
the courts. On appeal in the Third Circuit addressed the question 
of whether a regulation can create a right enforceable through § 
1983, in the absence of clear rights-creating language in the stat-
ute.126 Justice Stevens had argued in his Sandoval dissent that 
the courts should apply Chevron deference in such situations, 
allowing agencies to create rights in regulations when interpret-
ing broadly-worded statutes, unless the regulations are an unrea-
sonable interpretation of the statute.127 The Third Circuit did 
not agree. They held that an administrative regulation could not 
create a right enforceable under § 1983 unless the right can be 
implied from the statute authorizing the regulation.128 Using the 
Supreme Court’s Blessing v. Freestone test129 to see if the right 
can be implied from the regulation adopted under § 602 and 
enforced with 42 U.S.C. § 1983, they ruled that it could not.130
The “we won’t find any rights you can enforce unless 
Congress clearly spelled them out for you” trend was made 
harder the following year, with a 2002 U.S. Supreme Court rul-
ing in Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe.131 Gonzaga made the Blessing test 
even harder to meet, requiring that Congress intend to create a 
federal right, not merely intend the statute to benefit the plain-
tiff.132 Gonzaga boldly states: “We now reject the notion that our 
cases permit anything short of an unambiguously conferred right 
to support a cause of action brought under § 1983.”133
The Fox Now Guards The heNhouse
With this nail in the coffin of environmental justice litigation, 
the courts have basically said: If you can’t prove the federally-
funded agency’s discrimination is intentional, all you can do is 
to complain to the agency itself and ask them to hold themselves 
accountable. Asking the fox to guard the henhouse has been as 
fruitful as one might imagine.134 About 250 Title VI complaints 
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were filed with the EPA’s Office of Civil Rights from 1993 to 
2011, the vast majority of which were dismissed or rejected.135
The EPA’s first decision on a Title VI complaint was in 
1998, ruling on a complaint against Michigan’s environmental 
agency for permitting Select Steel to build a new steel mill in 
their predominantly African-American neighborhood of Flint, 
Michigan.136 In their decision, the EPA found no discrimina-
tion.137 The EPA assumed that the proposed steel mill would be 
in compliance with environmental laws, and held that complying 
with environmental laws means that there would be no “adverse 
effect” on the community.138 The EPA further held “[i]f there 
is no adverse effect from the permitted activity, there can be no 
finding of a discriminatory effect which would violate Title VI 
and EPA’s implementing regulations.”139
The EPA’s position in their Select Steel decision is that there 
can be no violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act because 
there is no violation of environmental laws.140 This contradicts 
the Department of Justice’s interpretation that civil rights laws 
are independent and that compliance is evaluated in light of 
anti-discrimination requirements.141 It also contradicts common 
sense, since environmental laws are designed to allow certain 
levels of pollution – usually without factoring in other nearby 
sources of pollution – and allowable pollution levels are often 
based on what is technically and economically possible for an 
industry to achieve, not on what levels are healthy for the com-
munity. The inevitable “adverse” affects on health can surely 
have a discriminatory effect, even if pollution levels are within 
permitted limits, as the District Court in Camden recognized.142
Even when you win, you lose. In August 2011, the EPA 
finally issued an investigative report on a 1999 Title VI complaint 
filed over disparate impacts of methyl bromide pesticide spray-
ing near grade schools predominantly serving Latino children in 
California.143 In the only case where the EPA ever found a viola-
tion of Title VI,144 it failed to provide a meaningful remedy.145 
After 12 years of delays, the EPA secretly negotiated a settle-
ment with the California Department of Pesticide Regulation, 
without involving the plaintiffs, and settled for additional moni-
toring of methyl bromide near schools, and “outreach” by the 
Department of Pesticide Regulation.146 The plaintiffs, and all 
future school children won no real relief from this decision. The 
EPA is supposed to withhold federal funding when it finds Title 
VI violations.147 Settling in secret for crumbs when it finds its 
first violation is not promising.
The Obama White House and EPA Administrator, Lisa 
Jackson, while claiming to take environmental justice and civil 
rights seriously, have permitted this awful decision under their 
watch.148 EPA’s latest decision, in August 2012, confirms that 
EPA – even under presumably favorable political leadership – 
is not a place to find justice. The Center for Race, Poverty and 
the Environment had to sue the EPA to finally get the agency to 
decide on a case filed eighteen years earlier, in 1994.149 Only 
when the court imposed a deadline on the EPA, did the EPA 
finally act on complaint – by dismissing it.150 The complaint 
alleged discrimination with regard to the fact that all three of 
California’s hazardous waste landfills are in low-income Latino 
communities.151 The EPA absolved the federally-funded state 
agency that permitted the facilities because they were not actu-
ally involved in siting the facilities.152 Such an interpretation is 
quite dangerous, since state permitting agencies rarely pick the 
sites, but do decide whether to grant permits for where corpora-
tions seek to build polluting facilities. Stunningly, the EPA also 
found that the three hazardous waste landfills did not harm public 
health despite unexplained birth defect clusters and high infant 
mortality rates.153 In coming to this conclusion, the EPA failed to 
evaluate the impact of diesel trucks coming to the facilities, even 
though the agency had awarded a California group, Greenaction, 
a grant to work with one of these communities specifically on 
diesel pollution issues.154
Such twelve to eighteen year delays are not uncommon. 
The EPA is required to accept for investigation or deny a Title 
VI complaint within 20 days, and within 180 days of accepting 
one, must issue preliminary findings from its investigation.155 
However, many complaints have languished fifteen years or more 
without any agency response.156 In 2003, the U.S. Commission 
on Civil Rights found that the EPA lacked an effective system 
for investigating the growing backlog of complaints.157 In 2009, 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against the EPA in the 
first case related to the backlog of Title VI complaints, noting 
a “consistent pattern of delay by the EPA” and that the delays 
in that case “appear, sadly and unfortunately, typical of those 
who appeal to [the EPA] to remedy civil rights violations.”158 
In 2011, a Deloitte Consulting LLP report on the EPA’s Office 
of Civil Rights showed that their backlog problems continue.159
“EnvironmEntal JusticE” lEgislation
After several years of frustration with courts refusing to hear 
environmental racism claims on the merits and the EPA failing to 
respond to Title VI complaints, some environmental justice activ-
ists have sought to legislatively “fix” Sandoval. In 2006, Senator 
Menendez (D-NJ) introduced S. 4009, the Environmental Justice 
Enforcement Act of 2006.160 In 2008, on the seventh anniversary 
of the Sandoval ruling, Senator Menendez reintroduced the bill 
as S. 2918, and Congresswoman Solis (D-CA) introduced the 
same, as H.R. 5896.161 The legislation has not been reintroduced 
in either the 111th or 112th Congress (2009-2012).
The Environmental Justice Enforcement Act essentially 
overturns key findings in Sandoval and a whole string of cases 
preceding it by creating a clear statutory right to sue for dis-
parate impacts under § 601.162 Section 601 would be amended 
so that a recipient of federal funds accused of discriminatory 
impact may only escape liability if they can “demonstrate that 
the challenged policy or practice is related to and necessary to 
achieve the nondiscriminatory goals of the program or activity 
alleged to have been operated in a discriminatory manner.”163 A 
plaintiff may also prove discrimination by demonstrating that a 
less discriminatory alternative policy or practice exists, and that 
the recipient of federal funds refuses to adopt such alternative 
policy or practice.164 The legislation also clearly spells out rights 
to recovery.165 Plaintiffs bringing claims based on disparate 
impact may recover equitable relief, attorney’s fees (including 
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expert fees), and costs.166 Those bringing claims of intentional 
discrimination may also recover compensatory and punitive 
damages, though punitive damages are not available against 
governmental bodies.167
While framed as an environmental justice bill, the 
Environmental Justice Enforcement Act is not limited to environ-
mental claims. It would reopen doors to private disparate impact 
claims of any sort that are “on the basis of race, color or national 
origin.”168 Perhaps if the rest of the civil rights movement were 
aware of this, or if the Obama Administration’s actions were as 
serious about combating discrimination as his words, the legisla-
tion would have been reintroduced and made more of a priority.
While passage of the 
Environmental Justice 
Enforcement Act would 
be a huge victory for 
civil rights, its impact on 
achieving environmental 
justice would be fairly 
small in the big picture. It 
is hard for most commu-
nity groups to bring Title 
VI cases without free legal 
help, which the groups in 
Chester and Camden had. 
The number of communi-
ties that can bring claims 
is also limited, since such 
cases are only likely to 
succeed where there are 
blatant racial disparities, 
comparable to Chester and Camden. Many other “environmen-
tal justice” communities don’t share such stark demographic 
disparities, and some are likely to be seen as arguable, such as 
where major polluting facilities are planned in poor, rural white 
areas adjacent to prisons housing mostly racial minorities, as is 
the case in a community near Gilberton, Pennsylvania.169 Since 
Title VI provides no protection for class discrimination, many 
impoverished and heavily impacted communities, like those suf-
fering in West Virginia’s mountaintop removal mining regions, 
are left without legal protection. Some have argued that the 
future direction of environmental justice law needs to include 
protections for victims of economic discrimination.170
Even with a private right of action on race and class discrim-
ination, the legal tool lends itself to a one facility at a time, one 
community at a time, solution. With the systematic onslaught of 
pollution and unnecessary industries, it would be more appro-
priate for the environmental justice movement to be pushing 
for broader policy-level changes, not unlike the Environmental 
Justice Enforcement Act’s “prove discrimination by demon-
strating that a less discriminatory alternative policy or practice 
exists” idea – but one where people could sue if the government 
permits a company to operate a technology where a less pol-
luting alternative technology or practice exists. Currently, under 
the National Environmental Policy Act,171 certain federally 
funded or sponsored projects must do an Environmental Impact 
Statement that is supposed to include an analysis of alternatives, 
but there is no requirement that the project proponents actually 
adopt any of the better alternatives they write up in the impact 
statement.172
Until we see the day when these broader policies are politi-
cally possible, we must take advantage of every opportunity to 
protect every community from environmental harm – especially 
those that are made easy targets because of actual or perceived 
political powerlessness. A renewed Title VI would be a weak 
tool toward “justice.” A wave of lawsuits would, at best, start 
to redistribute environmental harms, with some polluting proj-
ects turning their sights 
on communities with a 
larger white population. 
Any distributional equity 
would mostly pertain to 
locating new polluters, as 
such litigation isn’t likely 
to dislodge and relocate 
existing industries.
When corporate pol-
luters are chased out of a 
community, most give up 
after targeting one or two 
other communities. Some 
are more persistent. In 
1998, a company named 
PhilPower Corporation 
sought to build a wood 
waste incinerator in 
Delaware.173 They targeted one community after another – ulti-
mately targeting six communities.174 Most were communities 
of color, but when they tried to set foot in a suburban white 
community, that was enough to get state legislation moving that 
ultimately banned incinerators statewide in 2000.175
This is an ideal example of where equity can be a step 
toward justice. However, more typical examples from other, 
more famous, environmental justice battles didn’t turn out so 
well. In the LES example, the company tried three more times, 
twice in whiter communities in Tennessee, where they were 
defeated both times, and ultimately landed in a low-income, 
forty-five percent Hispanic community in New Mexico.176 
While this is more “equitable” than the company’s initial target, 
it is still environmental racism and it will still do grave harm to 
the environment and the people who live in the region. Another 
notorious example, well-known in the environmental justice 
movement, is that of Shintech – a Japanese company that sought 
to built a PVC plastics factory in Convent, Louisiana, in a region 
known as “cancer alley” due to the high concentration of petro-
leum refineries, chemical, and plastic production facilities.177 
While the battle against Shintech stopped them from locating in 
Convent, they ultimately got a facility built – albeit smaller – in 
a largely white community in another county in the region.178
Since Title VI provides 
no protection for class 
discrimination, many 
impoverished and heavily 
impacted communities … are 
left without legal protection.
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EnvironmEntal Equity is impossiblE
Given unequal routes of exposure to toxic pollutants, even 
those released in white communities disproportionately impact 
people of color. Some racial minorities consume more fish 
and thus suffer higher exposure to toxic mercury, dioxins and 
PCBs.179 Dioxins and PCBs travel quite far, accumulating at 
the Earth’s poles. Indigenous people living in the Arctic Circle 
subsist necessarily on a diet heavy in animal fat, where these 
toxins accumulate at high doses, with one of the largest sources 
having been a trash incinerator in an environmental justice com-
munity in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. In both cases, the racially 
disparate exposures would occur even if every smokestack were 
in a nearby affluent white community, as the pollutants (and fish) 
travel before the uneven exposures are felt.
Water fluoridation is another example where toxic expo-
sure is inherently unequal. While urban communities are 
most often fluoridated, disproportionately exposing people of 
color to the hazardous chemicals used, the chemicals – even 
within the same community –impact people of color more than 
whites. Fluoride helps the body absorb lead, which affects the 
brain in ways that diminish IQ and contribute to learning dis-
abilities, violent behavior and increased likelihood of cocaine 
addiction. The fluoride-induced increase in lead exposure is 
most pronounced in blacks, and also affects Hispanics more 
than whites.180
ConClusion
The “environmental equity” goal of redistributing harms 
is not only impossible, but is largely undesirable. For the worst 
environmentally harmful industries, such as nuclear reactors, 
combustion-based power plants, incinerators, and the like there 
are alternatives that are generally cheaper, zero-emission, and 
which produce far more jobs. For these types of harmful indus-
tries, it’s proper to say “Not in Anyone’s Backyard.” Such a posi-
tion fits with the Principles of Environmental Justice.
The equity concept only belongs to bringing fairness in the 
distribution of socially beneficial things (such as access to parks 
and public transit, or availability of fresh produce in urban “food 
deserts” – each of which have been tackled as environmental 
justice issues), and in socially necessary facilities that carry 
some risk (such as recycling facilities, where the siting should be 
made more equitable and the impacts should be insolated from 
residential land uses).
Given this, it does not make sense to pose legislative 
solutions in terms of environmental justice. Most “environ-
mental justice” policies have actually been “equity” policies 
weakly designed to redistribute harms. Such policies usually 
just focus on increased “public involvement,” but some aim 
to establish protocols that discourage agency permitting of 
new polluting facilities in designated “environmental justice” 
communities.
While it’s good to discourage the concentration of new pol-
luters where existing polluters are already concentrated – mainly 
low-income communities and communities of color – it hardly 
goes far enough. There is still the matter of existing polluters, 
and no one has seriously proposed uprooting industries in order 
to relocate some in wealthy, white suburbs. Clearly, that would 
prove politically impossible, and any such effort, even if legal, 
would be economically ridiculous and politically divisive. If 
there were economic resources (and political will) to relocate 
polluting industries, then those funds would be better put into 
replacing the polluting technology with non-pollution alterna-
tives. It is more strategic to help more privileged communities 
understand how they are also affected by pollution, and to use 
that awareness to create a solidarity to work toward broader 
solutions.
Policies designed to redistribute beneficial things (parks, 
groceries, access to public transit, health care, schools...) are 
good and can be honestly framed as equity policies. A law 
designed to ensure equitable enforcement of environmental laws 
would be most helpful, and would also fairly fall in the “equity” 
realm.
Policies that are truly about environmental justice are 
unlikely to be framed in such terms, as they would look like 
laws that help everyone by transitioning from various pollut-
ing practices to clean ones. Examples include laws replacing 
toxic chemicals with safe alternatives, banning incineration, or 
removing dirty energy subsidies. Such laws would most help the 
communities of color who suffer the disproportionate impacts, 
but the laws themselves would not need to be framed in terms 
If there were economic resources (and political will)  
to relocate polluting industries, then those funds  
would be better put into replacing the polluting 
technology with non-pollution alternatives. 
111468_AU_SDLP.indd   12 3/18/13   9:03 AM
132012–2013
of environmental justice or with any race-based language. This 
is just as well, and advisable, considering the misguided “color-
blind” approach that courts have taken with such issues as affir-
mative action.
As we sharpen legal tools to achieve environmental justice 
for all, we must not sell short and settle for equity of harms 
disguised as justice. As Martin Luther King, Jr. knew, injustice 
anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.181
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